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from The Angel to Orpheus: 
fictions of Self-Transformation in Rilke's 
Late Poetry 
Peter McCormick 
In a letter to one of his friends a year before he died in 1926 Rilke 
wrote of the connections between his last works, the "Duino Elegies" 
and che .. Sonnets to Orpheus": "Elegies and Sonnets support each 
other constantly. And I consider it an infinite grace that, \t•ich the same 
brearh, I was permitted to fill both these sails:the small rust coloured 
sail of the Sonnets and the Elegies' gigantic white canvas."l 
These poems have long interested Rilke's most accomplished read­
ers and translators for different reasons. One pivotal concern is 
clearly the relation in Rilke's work between the figure of the angel in 
the Elegies and the figure of Orpheus in the Sonnets. I should like to 
begin with a distinguished recent interpretation of that relation, that 
of the American poet and critic, Robert Hass.z My concern will be to 
call attention to one peculiar effect some poetic works can have on 
competent readers, what I will call the presentation of certain ethical 
ideals, as here, the invitation to a transformation of the self. But the 
notion of self-transformation is obscure. Consequently, I would then 
like to investigate critically two recent accounts of personal identity 
with a view to locating conceptual resources for articulating the 
notion of self-transformation more clearly. With these resources in 
hand I want finally to return to Rilke's later poetry and offer a sketch 
only of that breath which filled the small rust-colored sail and the 
gigantic white canvas of his late poetry, a sketch of a kind of nothing. 
1 .  Poetic Fictions and Self-Transformations 
Rilke spent the winter 1 9 1 1 - 1 9 1 2  high on the coast of the Adriatic 
sea at the castle of Duino. In  one of the extraordinary moments of his 
life while walking in a furious storm he later wrote his host, u . • • it 
seemed a voice had called ... ·who, if I cried out, would hear me 
among the angels' hierarchies?'" He copied this line down and, by the 
evening, he had written the first of what he already knew would 
finally be ten elegies, the Duino Elegies. Here is the celebrated open­
ing of that first elegy: 
Who, if I cried out, would hear me among the angels' 
hierarchies? and even if one of them pressed me 
suddenly against his heart: I would be consumed 
Copyright © 1987 P. McCormick. 
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in that overwhelming existence. For beauty is nothing 
but the beginning of terror, which we still are just able to endure 
and we are so awed because it serenely disdains 
' 
to annihilate us.  Every angel is terrify ing. 
" ... the angels embody the sense of absence, " the critic , Robert Hass. 
comments, "which had been at the center of Rilke's willed and diffi­
cult life. They are absolute fulfillment. Or rather, absolute fulfillment 
if it existed, without any diminishmenr of intensity, completely out­
side us . . . .  " 3 This reflection is then elaborated: 
You feel a passion for someone so intense that the memory 
of their smell makes you dizzy and you would gladly throw 
yourself down the well of that other person, if the long 
hurtle in the dark ness would then be perfect inside you: 
that is the same longing for the angel. The angel is desire, if 
it were not desire, if it were pure being. Lived close to long 
enough, it turns every experience into desolation, because 
beauty is not what we want at those moments, death is 
what we want, an end to limit, an end to time. And -
... death doesn't even want us; it doesn't want us or not 
want us. All of this has become clear suddenly in Rilke's 
immensely supple syntax. He has defined and relinquished 
the source of a longing and regret so pure, it has sickened 
the roots of his life. It seems to me an act of great courage. 
And it enacts a spiritual loneliness so deep, so lacking in 
consolation, that there is nothing, in modern writing that 
can touch it. The company it belongs to is the third act of 
King Lear and certain passages in Dostoevsky's novels 
( xxxiv-xxxv ). 
Now, the critic here is doing at least three things-he is putting into 
his own words what he thinks the speaker in this poem is saying while 
taking this speaker to be Rilke himself; he is interpreting Rilke's poe­
try as both a definition of a peculiar species of personal longing and 
an act of relinquishment which has unusual consequences; and he is 
judging the sense of what he takes to be going on here in ethical 
terms. 
In particular, the critic understands Rilke to be using the figure of 
the angel as a representation of an impossible project, namely the per­
fect fulfillment of our deepest longings as human beings. This repres­
entation "lived close to long enough" is utterly inimical to a person's 
vitality. For with such a resplendent figure too much before us we are 
filled with such profound regret that we lose the will to live. And, 
even while recognizing that death itself is a mundane phenomenonin­
different to our plight, we want to die in order to still this infinite 
yearning for what is impossible and to do away with regret. 
Rilke is understood as defining a central fact about what it means to 
be a human being - namely, to enact endlessly an experience of basic 
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incompletion - and then to relinquish the search for a complete per­
sonal fulfillment finally seen to be impossible. But the figure which 
represents the satisfacrion of the infinite longing for completion 
remains always present. Thus, the relinquishment results in a pro­
found "loneliness" unerly " lacking in consolation.'' 
finally, the critic judges Rilke as having in this poem accomplished 
an act of great spiritual courage. What the critic finds courageous is 
Rilke's working so hard to define something essential in part of what 
it means to be a person while at the same time relinquishing any belief 
in an ineradicable hope having any substance. Rilke is courageous 
because he has worked to define clearly the nature of an inalienable 
hope which is finally an illusion. And because Rilke recognizes that 
such a work must result in relinquishing even the hope of consola­
tion, he must undergo a profound spiritual desolation. 
Now this reading of Rilke's late poetry, whatever its faults, has the 
merit of focussing our attention on one of the central figures and 
themes of Rilke's achievement. But if it is to bring essential features 
into clear view such a focus requires of us a sustained effort to distin­
guish between genuine effects of the poet's work and spurious side 
effects of the critic's apparatus. In this case I think we need to analyze 
much more carefully than the critic does here the all too familiar and 
all too obscure talk of transformation. What sense can it make to talk 
of Rilke's self-transformation in his late poetry? To treat such matters 
more carefully we will find it helpful to investigate briefly some cur­
rent work on the nature of the person and personal identity across the 
temporal phases of a life. 
2. Persons and Their Identities 
In one of the most important recent works4 on the nature of the per­
son the claim is urged that "the unity of a life involves no more than 
the various relations between the experiences in this life . . .  ". Persons 
of course are not just series of events, actions, and thoughts; they are 
also agents and thinkers. But persons do not exist as separate entities. 
We need to distinguish what this view rejects from what it accepts. 
This view accepts the idea that the lives of most human beings are 
properly characterized in terms of psychological and physical conti­
nuity and connectedness because human beings have overlapping 
memories, intentions, dispositions, traits, etc. connecting the earlier 
and later phases of their lives. But this view rejects the idea that the 
identity of a person requires something more than physical and psy­
chological continuity and connectedness, namely the perduring exist­
ence of some more fundamental and purely mental separate entity 
(whether this be a substance, a Cartesian ego, a soul, or an elusive 
self) which is the unique subject of that person's memories, inten-
4
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cions, dispositions, traits, etc. 
The account then is benignly reductionist. For, while accepting that 
the person is not just a scream of events, chis view nonetheless reduces 
the person co a set of experiences of physical and psychological conti­
nuities and connections whose unity is a matter of degree subject to 
important variations over time. Beyond such continuities and connec­
tions nothing else is either logically required for personal identity to 
hold nor indeed is to be found. 
What counts here is not the claim that a person is righcly described 
in reductionist terms. Rather, what really matters is 1 1  • • •  the prolong-
ing of psychological continuity, or, more importantly, of chose direct con. 
nections between phases of a mental life, the overlappings of which yield, 1 
an ordinary life, the psychological continuity that characterizes it from 
beginning to end .. .  this connectedness-and-continuity, though normally a 
feature of continued identity, is theoretically separable from ic . . .  it is, per. 
haps, of all the features of continued identity the one that ma"ers rnosr f0r 
US. 1 1 1 1  
Now when we return to Rilke's poetry with this account in hand we 
come upon such lines as these: 
Song, as you have taught it, is not desire, 
nor wooing any grace chat can be achieved; 
song is reality. Simple, for a god, 
But when can u,ie be real? When does he pour 
the earth, the stars, into us? Young man, 
it is not your loving, even if your mouth 
was forced wide open by your own voice-learn 
to forget that passionate music. It will end. 
True singing is a different breath, about 
nothing. A gust inside the god. A wind. 
(Sonnets I. 3 )  
But such demanding counsels assume an understanding of the person 
which arguably shows up at least three important difficulties in the 
present account. 
First, this account does not provide a sufficiently detailed descrip­
tion of how experiences are to be understood without postulating sub .. 
jects of experience. How are Peter's musings in the rose garden to be 
understood without Peter? More specifically, the stress on physical 
and psychological continuity and connectedness requires paying some 
attention to the fact that these experiences "are causally dependent on 
the continued existence ( identity) of the individual person. "5 To pre­
serve such experiences seems to require preserving the entity they 
depend on. 
Second, this account is too much centered on the person as an 
individual. One consequence is that the critical matter of the person's 
identity as a social and cultural entity is often passed over in silence. 
5
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This social dimension of personal identity most basically involves 
understanding the person in relation to others. But no account of per­
sonal identity in terms of individual identity alone seems adequate.0 
Part of what being Peter in the rose garden involves is coming from 
being Peter in the seminar room. 
Finally. this account is consistently articulated in third person 
terms. The result is an exrremely curious picture of the person from 
the outside only. an exterior view. "Philosophically speaking." one 
critic writes, c c this account views everything from the outside. In deal­
ing with personal identity, this conceals ... one of the main reasons why 
people think that it must be a determinate question whether soroe 
future experience will be theirs or not: that if it will be theirs, they 
can, as well as expecting that it will happen, also expect it, in the sense 
of imaginatively anticipating having it; and there seems to be no rea­
son for the idea that it is simply indeterminate whether I can approp­
riately do that or not. ,,7 What we require in an account of the person 
is an interior view as well, what we may call a first person account. 
Can we preserve the attractive economy of a reductionist view of 
the person that will incorporate a more credible description of the 
individual and social experiences of the person in first ·person terms as 
well? More specifically, what elements in a revised version of a reduc­
tionist account would speak to Rilke•s arresting figures of 
transformation? 
3. Leading the Lit1es of a. Person 
Reductionist views like the one just considered, a second recent 
account8 of the nature of the person and personal identity goes, 
always try to account for the unity of the person by trying to explain 
the relations among the various events that make up the physical and 
psychological continuities and connectedness of a person's life. But 
this attempt, it is asserted, cannot succeed , because no two events can 
be construed as part of the unity of a person's life without presuppos­
ing the logically prior existence of some underlying entity. This entity 
is the person, and the existence of persons has priority over the exist­
ence of their own mental states. This objection to the first account 
follows from a rich description of what it is to live the life of a 
person. 
The unity of a life, the non-reductionist story reads, is what consti­
tutes the identity of a person. And this unity must be understood as 
the unity of a whole not as the unity of a collection. Both a whole and 
a collection consist of parts. But the parts of a whole exhibit a differ­
ent kind of unity than what holds among the parts of a collection. For 
living a life has consequences which affect what shapes the whole of a 
life will assume. 
Further, an important place must be made in the understanding of 
personal identity for the phenomenon of death. Just as some projects 6
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have subsequent effects of such an order that the whole of a Ii r� I 
changed, so the thought of death as the ltmtt of a life exerct e an 
ante�edent effect on the shape which the whole of a life may a surne. 
And neither the denial that death is a misforrune nor the a enion 
that life is immortal do justice co how the phenomenon of death 
shapes the unity of a Life. 
Moreover "A person leads his life at a crossroads," this account 
goes, "at the point where a past that has affected him and a fu ture that 
lies open meet in the present". The person stands always at a cross­
roads in the sense that the person is always moving from a present 
moment towards the realization of certain future concerns which 
themselves arise out of past influences. 
Being a person also involves living through the fullness of our 
intentional states-spasmodic phenomena like "perceptual experien­
ces, attacks of dizziness, dreams, moments of terror, amusement, lust, 
or despair.'; Moreover, the person always �xperiences such states in a 
peculiar way. Thus mental states seem to consist of both an inten­
tional and a subjective component. 
Being a person furthermore involves being drawn to unify the dif­
ferent temporal phases of one's life. A person's basic attachment to 
his life is not based then either on the Hobbesian desire for biological 
continuation of the species or on the Benthamite desire for the pur .. 
suit of the varieties of pleasure, but on the aspiration to lead one's life 
by continually rearticulating "the process of deliberation that marks 
our lives as human agents". 
Finally, being a person involves living through progressive and qual­
itatively different changes in one's own evolution as a moral agent by 
attaining a progressively fuller insight into one's own nature. This 
progression takes place to the degree that a person manages to trans­
form three cardinal relations - the relation between the person's past 
and the present, that between the person's mental dispositions and 
mental states, and the relation between the person's conscious and 
unconscious mind. 
Now these six elements combine and interact in different ways. But 
the gist of this second account can be put as follows: " . . .  we are forced 
to conceive of our lives as shaped around a substantial self, and . . .  
part o f  what it is to live a human life is to be continually revising 
one's way towards an adequate conception of what that self is. "9 
Once again however, when we return to Rilke with this second view 
in hand, we come upon important passages which undermine its 
plausibility. How for example can such an account do justice to the 
kind of entity these lines address? 
Be forever dead in Eurydice - more gladly arise 
into the seamless life proclaimed in your song. 
Here, in the realm of decline, among momentary days, 
be the crystal cup that shattered even as it rang. 
7
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Be - and yet know the great void where all things begin, 
the infinite source of our inmost vibration, 
so that, this once, you may give it your perfect assent. 
To all that is used-up, and to all the muffled and dumb 
creatures in the world's full reserve, the unsayable sums, 
joyfully add yourself, and cancel the count. 
(Sonnets ll. 1 3 )  
In this context, how satisfactory is the central claim that the concept 
of a person is logically prior to the mental states that can be predi­
cated of the person? At one point the argument is offered: " If it is 
rrue that mental states arise, they must essentially belong to things 
chat can house dispositions. and this is where the person is required". 
But mental dispositions could more economically be lodged in the 
brain of a person considered reductively as no more than a series of 
psychological and physical states than put up prodigally in a separ­
ately existing entity . 10 Whatever Peter is need involve nothing more 
than being Peter at the seminar and being Peter in the rose garden. 
A further difficulty is the detailed description of mind here in terms 
of mental dispositions, mental states, and mental activities, desire, 
fantasy, and imagination. This description turns on a functional view 
of mind that "a disposition tends to induce mental states and behav­
iour which reinforce it; moreover, these effects occur because they 
�einforce it. " 1 1  Such a view, however, is not convincing. For it blinks 
che fact that exercising some dispositions may result not in the rein .. 
forcement of a disposition but in its loss. Leaving the seminar discus­
sion for a walk in the rose garden may lead not to the desire for still 
more garden walks, but to the desire for none whatsoever. (Moreover, 
not all individual dispositions are to be understood just in the evolu­
tionary terms of contributions to survival since not every single dis­
position is functional; some, say certain forms of altruistic behaviour 
among mammals, are in isolation dysfunctional. )  
Can we articulate a theory of the person then that would capture 
some of the genuine insights this non-reductionist account exhibits 
into the nature of the person as an activity which lives its life inten­
tionally and subjectively without overcommitting ourselves to a 
merely functional view a mind, or to an insufficiently argued assertion 
that some further fact is required for the identity of persons than 
physical and psychological continuity and connectedness? More par­
ticularly, just which, if any, of the numerous elements in a revised 
version of a non-reductionist account can satisfactorily conceptualize 
Rilke's concerns with self-transformation? 
4. Describing Penons Impersonally 
Now these two accounts of the person and personal idencity over time 
8
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clearly conflict. The first view, the reductionist view, explicitly affirms 
( P )  that the personal identity of a person over time consists in nothing 
more than the continued existence of that person's brain and body 
and various interrelated physical and psychological events. This claim 
means: (Pl ) no separately existing entity is required for a complete 
description of such an identity; ( P2 ) no distinct although not separ­
ately existing entity is required either; and (P3 )  a complete description 
of personal identity can be entirely impersonal. By contrast, the 
second view, the non-reductionist view, explicitly denies ( P).  and con­
sequently denies (Pl ), (P2), and (P3)  also. Thus we seem to be con­
fronted with a clear choice between one or the other; in no case, it 
would seem, can we hold both, since one cannot rationally affirm and 
deny the same thing. 
I want to show that the necessity for choosing between these two 
accounts is apparent only. For, although affirming both accounts 
clearly seems contradictory , the basic opposition between them is not 
properly described in terms of a pervasive logical incompatibility. 
Recall first that more than one question is at issue between the 
reductionist and the non-reductionist. The central issue, however, 
seems to be the same; namely whether. the nature of the person is 
properly understood in relational terms only, or whether some entity 
in addition to the brain, the body 1 and mental experiences must be 
introduced. The reductionist settles for the more economical view. 
But this interpretation of the discussion strikes me as superficial in 
two ways. It overlooks the different ways in which the phrase "the 
nature of the person" is understood in each of these accounts. And it 
also overlooks several responses in each of these accounts to more 
than just this question. I want to spend a moment on the first only of 
these poilnts. 
For the reductionist, 0What is the nature of the person?" is to be 
understood as the narrow question whether the identity of a person's 
existence is composed of physical and psychological continuities and 
connections over time and no further fact (P:2 l 5 ). By contrast, for the 
non,reductionist "What is the nature of the person?" is to be under­
stood as the broader question whether the identify with itself of the 
process of living a life as a person can be understood without appeal, 
ing to some enduring entity other than the interrelatedness of approp­
riate psychological or physical events. (W: 1 1  ). Evidently, these two 
questions are closely connected. Each is concerned with whether, and 
if so, then just how a person can properly be said to perdure as the 
numerically same penon over time. Each is also concerned with sped, 
fying certain features which would serve as criteria for the claim that, 
say, Peter on the garden path is the numerically same person as Peter 
in the seminar discussion. And each is acutely sensitive to providing 
an account which, in one way or another, leaves the decision between 
materialism and immaterialism an open matter. 
9
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But, while similar. these two questions are just as clearly different. 
The reductionist question is much more narrow than the non­
reducrionist one. Indeed. this is one of the charges used in support of 
che claim that the reductionist account is inadequate (W:: 1 5  ). 
Moreover, the reductionist question is less exposed to the charge that 
it conflates the identity relation with the unity relation than the non­
reductionist thinks, for the reductionist himself distinguishes between 
expfaining the unity of consciousness at any time and the unity of a 
whole life (P:2 1 6-7 ). Further, the reductionist question allows for an 
indeterminate answer in some cases (consider brain bisection or brain 
rransplants or tele-transportation of brain states), whereas the non­
reductionist question insists that any answer must be determinate. 
Moreover, the reductionist question involves the claim that an imper­
sonal answer can be a complete one, whereas the non-reductionist 
question rejects such a claim. And, finally, the non-reductionist ques­
tion, but not the reductionist question, allows an answer in other 
terms than necessary and sufficient conditions. The reductionist 
account recognizes that other features may be important in any answer 
that is proposed to the reductionist question. but those features are 
seen to be supplements merely to the essence of the solution which is 
the conjunction of necessary and sufficient conditions in a criterion 
for personal identity over time. The non-reductionist account recog­
nizes the interest in including in a reply such a criterion; but it rele-. gates this criterion and those conditions to a subordinate· role and 
reserves the principal role for the provision of as full a set of descrip­
tive features as one can obtain. 
Now these facts suggest that judging the non-reductionist charges 
against its rival as correct is a mistake. Similarly, something seems to 
be just as wrong in construing the reductionist charges against ics rival 
as correct. The mistake in both cases lies in thinking that both 
accounts are addressed as answers to one and the same question; they 
are not. On the one hand, the non-reductionist account asserts that its 
rival is fatally flawed, but then goes on to provide arguments against 
an answer proposed to a different question than the one which is the 
object of the reductionist's concern. However good or bad these 
arguments may be in themselves (and we have already seen several prob­
lems) they are not adduced in support of the central assertion. That 
assertion is left without adequate support-it is a bare assertion. On 
the other hand, the reductionist account argues that any further the-
ory such as the rival one here is fatally flawed, and then does provide 
arguments for this assertion. The problem then is not the lack of 
arguments but with the fact that these arguments remain inconclusive. 
For on what other final grounds than parsimony are we to accept such 
a thoroughgoing and barely credible skepticism? 
A reasonable verdict then is that, although these two views conflict 
in a number of interesting philosophical ways, we are not compelled 
10
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to choose between them. For these accounts, however contrary, are 
not finally logically contradictory. Consequently, the choice between 
at least these reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of the nature 
of the person and of personal identity we may legitimately leave open 
for further inquiry. We are then rationally justified in trying to see 
whether several of the· most interesting elements in each account can 
be integrated selectively into our concerns with Rilke's talk of 
self-transformation. 
5. Indaerminaienas and Future Sel� 
One suggestive element in the reductionist account we do well to 
scrutinize is indeterminateness and future selves. The indeterminate­
ness thesis. is the view that, despite natural inclinations to believe oth­
erwise, the answer to the question as to whether any future person 
must be either me or someone else need not be determinate (P:2 1 4  ). 
This claim involves the notion that some questions are properly des­
cribed as empty questions that is, those whose answers would be 
neither true nor false. The question "Will the entity in the rose 
garden tomorrow be either me or someone else!" is, in some cases, an 
empty question in that the choice we are asked to make is not 
between two different states of affairs but between two different des­
criptions of the same state of affairs. 
But the indeterminateness thesis articulates an issue arising in some 
cases only, cases like the "combined spectrum'' which suggest that, 
despite my natural inclinations, my beliefs that any future person 
must be ei·ther me or someone else cannot be true. The case, as I shall 
describe it (after Parfit and Williams) is that of the neuro-biological 
surgical group which is able to manipulate through electrodes and 
chemical emplacemenlfs and both brain tissue and body tissue transplants 
the full spectrum of my psychological and physical continuity and 
connectedness. 
At the near end of the spectrum the team would activate only a few 
emplacements and substitute exact duplicates of only a small percen­
tage of my cells. Accordingly, while losing only a few of my real 
memories I would acquire only a few apparent memories that fit the 
life of someone else, and while losing only a few of my actual cells, I 
would acquire only a few functioning duplicates of my brain tissue 
and other body tissue as transplants. At the far end of the spectrum the 
team would revive from much more complex operations an entity who 
would have virtually no memories that corresponded to my own past 
and virtually none of the original cells of both my present brain and 
body. Now, the person reviving from the first operation would! almost 
certainly be me because of the very great, although not full, degree to 
which psychological and physical continuity and connectedness would 
have been retained. But the person reviving from the second opera­
tion would almost certainly not be me because of the very little degree 
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ro which such interrelatedness would have been retained. But "if any 
future person must be either me or someone else. there must be a line 
in this range of cases up to which the resulting person would be me, 
and beyond which he would be someone else" (P:277). Yet the com­
bined spectrum case shows merely a neuro-biological surgical team 
making one further psychological change and one further cell trans­
plant. Hence, the question whether the resulting person is either me 
or someone else is an empty question in the sense that whatever 
answer we may provide is simply one of two possible descriptions of 
the same state of affairs. It is conceivable, then, that, despite our 
deeply seated inclinations to believe that there must always be a deep 
difference between some future person being either me or someone 
else , being either Peter in the rose garden or not Peter in the rose 
garden, in some cases questions about personal identity have no 
determinate answer. 
Consider now the nature of these future persons as indeterminate 
entities. In the case of future states of what we assume to be our per­
during persons, we need to distinguish our descendants from our 
future selves. We can do so rather simply by recalling that the psycho­
logical interrelatedness between the prior and subsequent events of 
the same person's life are described in terms of psychological con­
nectedness and psychological continuity. In the case of one's future 
descendants, I want to hold that we are talking pre-eminently about 
psychological connectedness, whereas in the case of future selves we 
are talking mainly about psychological continuity. On the reductionist 
view both relations matter and neither is understood as more impor­
tant than the other (P:301 ) . But, when we are talking about future 
selves as opposed to descendants, what matters most is not so much 
the genetic propensities which foster in one's descendants the devel­
opment of certain dispositions which are connected with one's own. 
What matters rather is the actual psychological continuities, memo­
ries, intentions, desires, and so on between our present and future 
selves. So some of our future states are not so much to be understood 
as our descendants to whom we are both physically and psychologi­
cally connected but as our future selves with whom, additionally and 
pre-eminently, we share certain psychological continuities. 
We have already seen that in some cases the answer to certain kinds 
of questions about our future states is not determinate. We need now 
to carry this result over to our discussion of future selves. The point 
of that earlier discussion is that, although our relations with our own 
future selves involve especially psychological continuities, these con­
tinuities are subject to variations. Such continuities which may subsist 
then between me and my future selves are always a matter of degree. 
In some cases the relatedness may be so attenuated that a certain ques­
tion about the identity of a particular future self may be nothing more 
than an empty question. But what about those other cases where such 12
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a question is not empty ? How are we to describe those cases! 
In the case of future selves we need to introduce the notion of 
degrees of both connectedness and continuity. We then can say that 
the degree of psychological continuity is more or less great as a func-
tion of just how much memory. intention, and so on is psychologically con. 
tinuous between me and any one of my future selves . Notice, however. a 
problem. How are we to determine such matters of degree when one of tht 
key terms in the relation, namely my future self. does not yet exist? One 
solution lies in seeing that any one of my future selves is not to be found 
inalienably fixed to some future time down the course of my as yet unlived 
life, down the garden path. For my future selves are already anticipated in 
t·he present through my imaginings just as my past selves still linger in the 
present through my rememberings. The difference between these two kinds 
of selves is that past selves are still present and are so in determinate ways 
whereas future selves are already present but only indeterminately. My 
sugge$tion is that we stress psychological continuities instead of con­
nectedness, and that instead of the degree of psychological continuity 
we stress a particular element in such continuity. what I want to call a 
basic intention. On this account then my first claim is that Rilke•s talk 
of self-transformation may reasonably be construed as needing to care 
at least as much for oneself as a future self however indeterminate as 
needing to care for oneself as an actual person. But such talk of "car­
ing" is obscure. 
6. Self-Concern and V'frtual PeTSoru 
Turn now to a suggestive element in the non .. reductionist account. the 
relation in which someone believes himself to stand to his own future 
states. This relation is called "self-concern" (W:236-56 ), a relation 
which "neither is nor includes an attitude towards myself' (241 ). 
How then does self-concern differ from other basic attitudes to 
oneselfl 
Consider first the attitude one may assume with regard to one's 
own desires, their fulfillment or frustration, namely "egoism". Egoism 
consists in a person's believing that his own desires and their fulfil­
lment, regardless of what may be the specific object of such desires, 
are more important than those of others. By contrast, self-concern 
involves no preference claim for the superiority of one's own future 
states over those of others. Thus self-concern does not do away with 
egoism but it does not presuppose it either. 
Consider next the attitude one may assume in seeing the course of 
one's future life in terms of a harmonious equilibrium between plea­
sure and pain. This attitude is called Hfinding life worth living.,,  And 
it "consists tin two things - a concern with whether some future state 
will contribute to harmony, and the presupposition that one's present 
states are already harmonious. But, as the case of rational suicide 
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shows, self-concern does not involve finding life worth living in either 
of these two respects. 
Consider finally the attitude which consists in finding in one's life 
sufficient conditions for fulfilling those desires. plans, and projects 
one finds important. This attitude is called c c  finding life worthwhile." 
And once again such an attitude involves two elements - concern 
with whether my future states will contribute to the realization of my 
projects and the presupposition that my present state already does. 
This attitude is not the same as the previous one, for it is perfectly 
possible for someone to find life worth living but not worthwhile, as 
presumably Napoleon did on St.Helena, and life worthwhile but not 
worth living, as presumably Saint Peter did in Rome (W's examples). 
But self-concern involves neither, for self-concern is centered on 
something other than either the realization of harmony or the fulfil­
lment of projects. 
If self-concern then is neither egoism nor finding life worth living 
nor even finding life worthwhile, it nonetheless depends on the prior­
ity of desire for without desire there would be no self-concern. But 
self-concern characteristically is a matter not of the formation or 
presence of desire but of its motivational force. Accordingly, self­
concern is not an attitude towards oneself nor an indifference to one's 
own future states but a non-preferential and non-instrumental relation 
co the importance and value of one's own future states and those of 
others. Unlike self love, self-concern depends on no one factor. Nor 
does self-concern depend on any particular feature of the person's 
psychology as a whole, and it both derives from and is partly constitu­
tive of the process of living as a person. As such self-concern is care­
fully correlated with the capacity to enter into one's past present and 
future states of mind as one's own. 
On the present account then the nature of self-concern lies in the 
central contention of the non-reductionist view, namely that some­
thing more is required to account for the nature of the person than 
interrelatedness. What is required is the presence of ourselves as per­
sisting entities irreducible to mere interrelatedness. This persisting 
presence is to be understood as our ongoing capacity to enter into the 
fullness of our present states and thereby gain that acquaintance with 
one's own present states which enables one both to retrieve one's past 
states and their influence as well as to anticipate one's future states 
and concern with them as one's very own. 
Now this view of self-concern is, I believe, inseparable from the 
nonreductionist view of the person because it depends upon ·the claim 
that a persisting entity is required for the explanation of the identity 
of persons over time. That claim, however, includes the view that the 
question whether some future person is me or someone else must 
always have a determinate answer. But recall that we need not choose 
between the reductionist and the non,reductionist accounts. Hence we 
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may assen that in some cases such a question may have no determi­
nate answer. In the light of the non-reductionist description of self­
concern I want to suggest that the set of future states to which I stand 
in the relation of self-concern described here is usefully described as a 
"virtual person." I may stand then in a relation of self-concern, I will 
say, to my future self not just as an entirely indeterminate enity bur as 
a vaguely determinate entity I call a virtual person. 
Recall finally the discussion of weak and strong kinds of psycholog­
ical continuity, for this will give us the distinction we need to parse 
the unfamiliar notion I am proposing here of virtual person. In cases 
of those future selves with whom I now enjoy by anticipation strong 
bonds of psychological continuity, I want to speak not of future selves 
but of virtual persons, whereas in cases of those with whom the 
degrees of continuity are much less strong we may continue to speak 
of future selves. Virtual persons thus are intimately linked not so 
much with memory, desire, character, and/ or disposition as they are 
with basic intentions. In thinking of my,self in the future, I may enter­
tain a number of scenarios in each of which one of my future selves 
plays a more or less central role - in short, I may fantasize (see Mor­
ton 1985 ). But when I think of myself in the future, I may just as well 
articulate a number of scenes in each of which the same virtual person 
struggles to fulfill a basic intention to realize a life ideal which is 
already at the basis of my own multiple strivings here and now in the 
present-I may imagine. In the first case, the entity in question is 
clearly the object of some of my present psychological states. But no 
matter how richly detailed such a future self may be nor how many 
such selves may be fantasized, no one of them on the present terms 
can bear the burden of that peculiar kind of psychological continuity I 
am calling here my perduring basic intention to realize a life ideal. On 
these terms, however continuous such similar entities as future selves 
may be with respect to my pre.sent dispositions and desires, only a vir­
tual person can be continuous with my present basic intentions. In 
other words (P:3 l 5.-6 ), all my future selves are clearly my descendants 
but they are not all equally my relatives; some, my virtual persons, are 
more centrally related to me than others. On this account then I want 
to revise my initial claim to read that Rilke•s talk of self-transforma­
tion may reasonably be construed as coming into a standing relation 
of self-concern with at least one of those imagined future selves I call 
my virtual person. 
7. Reintapreting Fictions of Self-TTansformation in Rilke's Late 
Poetry 
In February 1922, after the beginnings at Duino ten years earlier and 
in a small house at Muzot in the Valais in Switzerland, Rilke suddenly, 
"with the same breath,,, in no more than one month, writes 26 
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sonnets, finishes the elegies, and then completes the second half of the 
sonnet cycle with 29 more while writing 8 other sonnets besides. 
Rilke succeeds here, we are told, in transforming his art by replacing 
the figure of the angel with that of Orpheus and in transforming 
himself. 
In an initial citation from Sonnets 1,5 the ·critic identifies the 
speaker as Rilke. 
Erect no gravestone to his memory; just 
let the rose blossom each year for his sake. 
For it is Orpheus. Wherever he has passed 
through this or that. We do not need to look 
for other names. When there is poetry, 
it is Orpheus singing. He lightly comes and goes. 
RHke is said to have found in these lines a way of interiorizing and 
transforming "' the sense of abandonment" which had followed on the 
discovery, definition, and relinquishment in the first two elegies writ­
ten in 1 9 1 2 .  
If this sonnet provides us with a glimpse of Rilke's return to the 
Orpheus figure, the third is said to exhibit a breakthrough in the for­
mulation "song is reality ." The breakthrough consists in Rilke's 
relinquishment, not just of any residual belief in the genuineness of an 
unstillable hope for perfect fulfillment as in the figure of the angel in ·"The First Elegy," but in his relinquishment also of any further 
representation in his poetry of the attractiveness of such an illusion. 
Creature of habit, Rilke compares us in Sonnets 1.3 with Orpheus 
and is again dismayed: 
A god can do it. But will you tell me how 
a man can penetrate through the lyre's strings? 
Our mind is split. And at the shadowed crossing 
of heart-roads, there is no temple for Apollo. 
A passage in "The Third Elegy" is said to exhibit "the change," from 
the earlier relinquishment to the later one. The idea seems to be that 
in the transition from the imagery of the passionate voice of desire, 
the wooing voice, to that of the pure voice of need, the bird's cry, 
Rilke has brought about a transformation not in his poetry but argua­
bly in his own understanding of himself. And this transformation is 
said to "culminate" in "The Ninth Elegy," where the poem is taken to 
be saying that living in the world is singing in the sense of praising . 
. . .  when the traveler returns from the mountain­
slopes into the valley, 
he brings, not a handful of earth, unsayable to others, 
but instead 
some word he has gained, some pure word, the yellow and 
blue 
gentian. Perhaps we are here in order to say: house, 
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bridge, fountain, gate, pitcher, fruit-tree, window -
Here is the time for the sa.,able, here is its homeland. 
Speak and bear witness. 
This kind of saying issues in a speaking, a singing (a making of cele­
bratory worlcs of art, poems of praise) which transforms our way of 
being in the world in such a way that our primary relation to every­
thing else becomes one of affirmation, the ''this is" of Rilke's friend's, 
of Paula Modersohn-Becker's painting, to be saying: "Being human . . .  
is to be constantly making one's place in language, in conscious-
ness, in imagination. The work 'steige tu ruck in den reinen Bezug,'  is •to 
rise again ha.ck into pure relation'" (Hass, xii). 
Now what are we to make of all this? 1 would suggest that we 
construe this kind of reading as a serious and thoughtful series of 
recommendations about what I want to call the ethical shapes our 
own future selves might well assume as virtual persons. 
Much of the argument for such a suggestion would involve a far 
more sustained examination of the complicated evolution of Rilke's 
late work than we have leisure for now. But at least three major 
notions appear in the course of that work. The initial idea is surely 
one of change at a rather abstract level. In "The Seventh Elegy ," for 
example, Rilke writes: 
Our life 
passes in transformation. And the external 
shrinks into less and less. Where once an enduring house was, 
now a cerebral structure crosses our path, completely 
belonging to the realm of concepts, as though it stood in 
the brain. 
' ''Transformation" here mu.st be understood in larger terms than 
merely psychological ones, terms that would account for the shift in 
Rilke's poetry from talk of a turn (eine Wende), to change (eine Wand­
lung), and finally to transmutation (eine Verwandlung). 
A second major notion in this development is the gradual deepen­
ing of what is meant by "a relation. "  Here the movement is from talk 
of a mere relationship with persons and things ( eine V erhaltnis) to a 
stress on relation as such ( ein &tug), to the insightful idea of standing 
in a relation to whatever is (in eine Beziehung stehen). And finally 
Rilke's work moves even more richly from a sustained reflection on 
nothing and nothingness ( das N ichts) to a richly modulated meditation 
on the more complex notion of the voidt of emptiness (das Leere). 
This extraordinary meditation yields many images, among them the 
image of a breath. Thus, not long before he died Rilke wrote in one of 
his uncollected poems, 
It is nothing but a breath, the void. 
And that green fulfillment 
of blossoming trees: a breath. 
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And he brought his "Sonnets to Orpheus" to an end with the lines: 
Si!ent friend of many distances, feel 
how your breath enlarges all of space. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper has been to try to understand more clearly sev­
eral issues which questions about putative self-transformation in 
Rilke's late poetry would seem to raise. And the strategy has been to 
examine two contrasting views on the nature of the person with a crit­
ical interest first in whether these accounts are exclusive in the sense 
chat holding one entails not holding che ocher and if nor then, second, 
just what conceptual resources each might make available for pursuing 
our aims further. The argument has been that even such carefully 
opposed views as che reductionist and non-reductionist ones exam­
ined here can be articulated in ocher ways than as simple logical con­
tradictories. When so formulated each provides us with at least one 
central notion that furthers our concern. On such a reading the reduc­
tionist account turns out to include an important notion about such 
future entities as indeterminate selves, whereas the nonreduccionisc 
account includes an equally important idea about the nature of self 
concern. The first, the idea of indeterminate entities, I go on to argue 
provides us with a way of construing the rationality of our concerns 
with our own future selves. And the second, the idea of self concern, 
makes available a way of construing our ethical responsiveness co our­
selves as virtual persons. Accordingly, I wane to conclude chat Rilke's 
talk about self-transformations, about becoming a certain type of per­
son in the future, is usefully recast as a question about what it means 
co be a person and about whether some future persons can be prop­
erly taken as the legitimate subjects of both rational and ethical con­
cerns in the present. 
I must now add that such a conclusion is not so much an answer co 
our initial question as an invitation co investigate more thoughtfully 
what responding to such a question would seem to involve. This invi­
tation cannot be pursued just now. But while concluding it may not 
be unhelpful to indicate in a quite programmatic way at lease one of 
the many directions such further inquiry could well cake. 
Accordingly, I would want to argue further that the rationality of 
our moral concern for ourselves as fictive selves and the ethical 
responsiveness we have for our future selves as virtual persons have at 
least one major consequence on how we think about future states of 
chose curious entities we call ourselves. My argument would be chat 
thinking of oneself as rationally and ethically responsible for, 
although not morally obligated co, one's own fictive self as a virtual 
person entails that we construe our present selves as those peculiar 
sorts of fictions I would call fictive persons. Such entities are not 
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selves. Rather. they are best understood as selfless persons in the sense Ou· 
whatever self such entities may properly be thought to have is an illusion . · 
Moreover . fictive persons are not just persons couc court because whatever 
it is we refer to in such a context as "a person" is properly unda-
stood not so much as an illusion but as a conceptual construct which 
is necessarily subsequent to the richness of predicative immediate 
experience. Rather, fictive persons I would suggest are better under­
stood on the model of fictional characters. This analogy would lead us 
finally to the view that those peculiar entities who come to under-
stand fictive selves as the ongoing realization of a rational and ethical 
responsiveness to the deep pathos of things are neither selves nor per­
sons but srimply quasi,personal and efficacious fictions, or no persons 
at all. In the light of such a view we might then be able to see that the 
general question here about peculiar kinds of fictions - how are we 
to understand the "I" in such lyric utterances of self-transformation 
as Rilke's "whisper to the silent earth: I'm flowing. I To the flashing 
water say: I am" - is neither an open nor an empty question but one 
which seems to require changes in our usual understandings of per-
sonal identity. 
The same breath that filled ffthe small rust coloured sail of the 
Sonnets and the Elegies' gigantic white canvas" in February 1922 
expired in these lines addressed to the mysterious figure of Orpheus, a 
fiction, a figure of self-transformation, a virtual person: 
Silent friend of many distances, feel 
how your breath enlarges all of space. 
Let your presence ring out like a bell 
into the night. What feeds upon your face 
grows mighty from the nourishment thus offered. 
Move through transformation, out and in. 
What is the deepest loss that you have suffered? 
If drinking is bitter, change yourself to wine. 
In this immeasurable darkness, be the power 
that rounds your senses in their magic ring, 
the sense of their mysterious encounter. 
And if the earthly no longer knows your name, 
whisper to the silent earth: I am flowing. 
To the flashing water say: I am. 
(Sonnets. Il.29) 
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NotH 
1 To W. Hule",c:. 1 3  Novembet- 1925. tt. S. Mitchell. m Rilke 1 982. 316. 
Further references m the text are to this ed1rion. 
Hass. m Rilke 1982. x1 - xliv. 
> Cf. Rilke·s comment in the letter abo� to Hulev.;c:: "The angel of the Elegies is 
that creature in whom the transformation of tM invisible mto the visible ... al­
ready ap�rs in its completion ... ; that being who guarantees the recognition of a 
higher level of reality in the invisible.·· 
• Parfit 1 984 ;  su�uent references are incorporated in the text. 
s Srrawson 1 984, 44. 
0 Ibid. 
1 Williams 1984. H. 
Wollheim 1985, 2.  Subsequent references arc in�rted in my tut. 
Q See Morton 1985, 688. 
'" Elster, 1 983. 
1 1 Elster, ibid. 
tz I rely here on Parfit's discussion. Further references to Parflt and Wollheim ar-e 
incorporated in the text and preceded by either "P" or "W". 
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